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THREEFOLD STORY OF A FAILED METHODOLOGY FOR
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Abstract. Reflective equilibrium, as a methodology for the ‘formation of log-
ics’, fails on the fringe, where intricate details can make or break a logical the-
ory. On the fringe, the process of theorification cannot be methodologically
governed by anything like reflective equilibrium. When logical theorising gets
tricky, there is nothing on the pre-theoretical side on which our theoretical
claims can reflect of—at least not in any meaningful way. Indeed, the fringe
is exclusively the domain of theoretical negotiations and the methodological
power of reflective equilibrium is merely nominal.
1. Prologue
Reflective equilibrium has been proposed as a methodology for logical theoris-
ing and, indeed, as a procedure for justifying our logical knowledge at least since
Goodman’s ‘The new riddle of induction’.1 In recent years, interest in it resurged,
particularly in the wake of the advances of the anti-exceptionalist programme in
logic. The general background for this paper will be given by a modest form of
anti-exceptionalism, compatible with logical immanentism—the view that logic is
immanent in language (see, e.g., Brandom, 2000)—which claims that the episte-
mology of logics is fallibilist; see, e.g., Peregrin and Svoboda (2013, 2016, 2017)
and also Read (2019). (Full-blooded anti-exceptionalism is, roughly, the view that
logic is not special, but rather contiguous with the empirical sciences (Hjortland,
2017; Priest, 2014; Russell, 2014; Williamson, 2007).)
In this paper, I will argue against the thesis that reflective equilibrium is a viable
methodology for logical theorising. This negative thesis does not deny that the
phenomenology of logical inquiry could be described, at least in part, in accordance
to the pattern provided by reflective equilibrium (hereafter often abbreviated as
‘RE’). This I gladly grant and duly deplore, for I believe that, ultimately, it is
the plausibility of this way of describing logical inquiry that is at the core of the
misguided tenet that RE is a meaningful methodology for logic. Instead, my claim is
that the processes normally associated with logical investigations are too complex,
too abstract, and too ‘theoretical’ to be in any substantive sense guided by RE.
I will present my arguments against reflective equilibrium via three case studies
of currently debated issues among logicians. These vignettes will, I hope, drive
home the following three points:
The first is that logical theorising is systematically biased in favour of theoretical
considerations and so RE is, qua methodology, too weak. The second is that RE
underdetermines both the identification of the specific problems one encounters in
‘the formation of logics’, i.e., problematisation, and the problem-solving process
itself. The third and final point I wish to make is that RE systematically favours
weaker logics.
1In Goodman (1955). The name, of course, is of a later date, being first used in Rawls (1971).
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2. Reflective equilibrium
So what is reflective equilibrium? In its most exalted sense, it is the ultimate
justification procedure open to some of our beliefs, including our logical beliefs. In
a more modest sense, it is a methodology in processes like formalisation, theorifica-
tion, modelling, etc. These two senses of RE are connected and it takes but a small
(up and ahead) step from the latter to the former. Both are evident in a celebrated
remark of Goodman’s, worth reproducing here in extenso:
Principles of deductive inference are justified by their conformity
with accepted deductive practice. Their validity depends upon ac-
cordance with the particular deductive inferences we actually make
and sanction. If a rule yields inacceptable inferences, we drop it as
invalid. Justification of general rules thus derives from judgments
rejecting or accepting particular deductive inferences.
This looks flagrantly circular. I have said that deductive infer-
ences are justified by their conformity to valid general rules, and
that general rules are justified by their conformity to valid infer-
ences. But this circle is a virtuous one. The point is that rules and
particular inferences alike are justified by being brought into agree-
ment with each other. A rule is amended if it yields an inference
we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a
rule we are unwilling to amend. […] [I]n the agreement achieved lies
the only justification needed for either. (Goodman, 1955, 63–64)
Much of what I have to say will target RE qua methodology. This is because I
take it that whatever problems beset it in this quality, also affect its status as a
state that justifies a body of beliefs: RE is supposed to generate an eponymous
doxastic state in which one’s logical beliefs are justified. But if the process does
not warrant the cogency of its outcomes, then what value can there be to either?
A state of RE may be seen as one where no further developments of one’s theories
is possible because there are no more apparent problems to resolve. (This is a
somewhat implausible contention, as it is not clear how, for instance, the effort to
achieve a simpler theory could be massaged into the simple picture of RE. But let
us grant it for the sake of the argument.) Yet the same situation could ensue as
an effect of lack of curiosity, of having a deficit of imagination, or low epistemic
standards. This kind of epistemic ‘tranquillity’ is a non-specific symptom. Insofar
at is has any value, this is due to the inherent virtues of the process that lead to it.
So what is this methodology? Goodman’s original description refers only to
inferences, principles of inference, and the relation between them. But we may
well suppose that articulating this relation involves a few more ingredients. So,
expanding a bit on the original schematic proposal, we can easily get a prima facie
plausible story that goes along the following lines:
One starts with a body of inchoate, perhaps practical or intuitive, knowledge
of a certain domain—for instance, that associated with the dispositions to infer
manifested in the daily ratiocinative practice, or even that obtained by a modicum
of reflection on the practice. That is, one starts with the knowledge expressed in
pre- or quasi- theoretical claims like ‘this argument is valid’, ‘that doesn’t follow’,
or perhaps even ‘valid arguments are truth-preserving’, etc. Call this 1-knowledge.2
2I do not wish to attach any precise philosophical sense to the word ‘knowledge’. Instead, it
is to be taken in the intuitive sense. To the extent that it is explicit knowledge, it consists of
both statements (factive, prescriptive, normative, etc.) and the conceptual apparatus (predicates,
relations, etc.) underlying them. However, I am not assuming that this knowledge must be
explicit; it can well be, at least partly, knowledge-how.
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This body of pre-theoretical knowledge is apt for further regimentation, pre-
cisification and expansion—by fine-tuning the conceptual apparatus behind it, by
discovering novel, perhaps more abstract or more general, relations between its ob-
jects, by forming new hypotheses, proving general statements, etc. Thus, one moves
from the knowledge that a particular item is an argument to a general account of
what arguments are, from the belief that valid arguments preserve truth to beliefs
like ‘valid deductive arguments preserve designated value on Tarskian models’, etc.
Call (all) this 2-knowledge.
The development and refinement of 2-knowledge—or, in one word, theorefica-
tion—proceeds and is kept in check by balancing it against 1-knowledge. Theo-
retical pronouncements are measured against the pre-theoretical knowledge that
inspired them in the first place. For instance, a rather bad putative definition of
argument as ‘speech in which, out of two given things, a third follows’ is suitably
modified upon realising that many (things that are usually called) arguments have
more or less than two premises (given things) and may well derive a conclusion
(third thing) that is, in fact, identical to (one of) the premise(s).
At the same time, 1-knowledge is, at least potentially, modifiable in light of
2-knowledge. For instance, it may be that 1-knowledge does not provide for a
distinction between inductive and deductive arguments (though maybe it could),
whereas 2-knowledge does. This theoretical distinction may inform 1-knowledge and
we may see hosts of savvy informal reasoners resorting to it in everyday contexts.
Or it may be that pre-theoretically we are disposed to infer in accordance with a
certain form of argument but, in virtue of general principles of validity developed
as part of 2-knowledge, we come to see that this is not the case (cf. infra, the
discussion of the ω-rule for an illustration of this case.)
Our logical theories and, with them, logical knowledge, are obtained and justified
as a result of this trade-off between pre-theoretical and theoretical beliefs.3
3. Formalisation and the formation of logics
Goodmanian reflective equilibrium seems to presuppose a non-conventionalist
view of logic. At any rate, it is easier to grasp the problems of RE if we assume,
without loss of generality, such a view. Recall Carnap’s famous Principle of toler-
ance:
In logic there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build his
own logic, i.e. his own form of language, as he wishes. All that is
required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his
methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical
arguments. (Carnap, 1959, §17)
For Carnap, the standard for the success of logics is not the extent to which they
‘correspond’ to natural language, the medium of human reasoning, but rather their
usefulness relative to the purposes for which they were designed.
Not so for the view that will provide the background for the present discussion.
On it, the relation between natural language and the logical formalism must go
beyond the latter’s usefulness in analysing the former. For specificity’s sake, let
our underlying view of logic be that it is obtained via a process of formalisation,
understood as ‘a kind of extraction […] of logical form’ out of natural language
(Peregrin and Svoboda, 2016, 4)—see also Peregrin and Svoboda (2013, 2017).4
The image suggested by RE is readily seen to fit some scenarios of ‘formalisation’
which are marked by but two parameters:
3For a more detailed discussion of the method see the opinionated survey in Cath (2016).
4For an alternative account of formalisation, see Brun (2014). For a monographic analysis of the
many problems raised by this deceptively simple concept see Brun (2003).
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(1) An informal argument like (arg): ‘Socrates is mortal because all men are
mortal.’
(2) A target logical system (e.g., first-order logic) or perhaps merely a target
logical syntax (e.g., Fregean syntax, by which I mean the sort of syntax that
explicitly features sentential operators and construes atomic declarative
sentences as having function-argument from, as opposed to, say, subject-
predicate form).5
Suppose now that we go about formalising (arg) in the Fregean syntax—our
target (tar). We already know its syncathegoremata: expressions like ‘all’, ‘some’,
the (grammatical) conjunctions ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if … then’, etc. We also know, by and
large, how to deal with them in (tar). All in all, we could arrive at the following
schematic rendering of (arg):
(1) ∀xMx
Ms
of which we make sense via a key that says thatM stands for mortal, x is a variable
ranging over the extension of ‘man’, and s an individual constant, standing for
Socrates.
It’s no achievement to see that this is a suboptimal—indeed, plainly wrong—
formalisation of (arg). For one thing, ‘All men are mortal’ was rendered formally
rather dumbly. For instance, man and mortal were placed in distinct grammatical
categories. Not only is this unpleasantly non-uniform, but it also obscures the
predicate status of man. We would do better to render this premise as ∀x(Wx →
Mx), with W standing for man and x ranging over a (generic) class of objects.
(Note that this is already a good step away from the ‘surface’ grammar of English.)
So we get an improved rendering of (arg), namely:
(2) ∀x(Wx→Mx)
Ms
the validity of which we check in (tar). (Actually, since (tar) is rather imprecise, the
validity check would have to be performed in a logic based on the Fregean syntax
or, at the very least, in a fragment of such a logic that contains enough information
about →, ∀, and the horizontal ‘inference’ line that ended up rendering ‘because’.)
Obviously, it is not.
Does this mean that the conclusion of (arg) does not follow logically from the
premise? Well, yes, it does mean that; still, we wouldn’t want to say that ‘Socrates
is mortal’ may be false when ‘All men are mortal’ is true. In this sense, we would
not want to revise our commitment to (arg). We figure out that we need another
premise, ‘Socrates is a man’, in order to validate both (arg) and its formalisation.
And so on and so forth: I am not particularly bent on boring the reader with
logical trivia. The salient point is that all this happens within the confines of a
more or less precise target formalism. At this level, of formalisation, it is quite
plausible to see our endeavours as governed by RE.
The formation of logics, to appropriate a term used by Peregrin and Svoboda
(2016, 2017), is, as it were, the next level of formalisation-qua-extraction. One
obtains a logic by making explicit (cf. Brandom, 1994) and bringing together into
a coherent ensemble the principles governing informal reasoning. No matter how
generous our notion of formalisation is, this is no mere formalisation, as a few
examples will show.
5This is not inconsistent with the Peregrin-Svoboda view of formalisation, as the ‘target’ need not
be thought of as being antecedently available. It can be just as well be ‘extracted’ in the process
of formalisation.
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Consider first the case of a working mathematician who believes, in the first
instance, that the ω-rule:
(3) P (0) P (1) . . . P (n) . . .∀x(x ∈ N→ Px)
is logically valid. Subsequently, and in light of various 2-knowledge beliefs—inference
rules are finitary, logic is topic-neutral, ‘natural number’ does not express a logical
property, logicism fails because of Russell’s paradox, etc.—she changes her mind
and decides not only that the ω-rule is not part of logic, but also that its syn-
tactic structure, and in particular its infinite number of premises, make it not an
inference rule at all. (This example may also serve to illustrate the modification of
1-knowledge in virtue of 2-knowledge discussed at the end of the previous section.)
Take now Peano’s axiom of induction. Its natural formulation involves quantifi-
cation over properties:
(4) ∀P (P (0) ∧ ∀n(P (n) → P (n+ 1)) → ∀nP (n))
For various (theoretical) reasons, this kind of formalisation was thought best to be
avoided and first-order logic, in which the quantifiers range only over individuals,
became the norm (for more on this see Eklund, 1996). The demise of second
order formalisms has little to do with what goes on in natural language, where
(apparent) quantification over properties is certainly present. It was and, to the
extent that the controversy is alive, it still is a matter of deploying heady theoretical
considerations.6 Languages may carry logics inside them, but it is still up to the
logicians to decide what to bring to the surface and how.
A third example will also illustrate the fact that, in many cases, the practice
is not at all coherent and it cannot light our way in a simple fashion. Take the
following rules governing a truth predicate T :
(5) A T -I
T 〈A〉
T 〈A〉
T -E
A
They seem innocuous enough. But add some equally innocuous reasoning principles
and pick the sentence named by 〈A〉 so that it is ‘This sentence is false’ and all hell
breaks loose, i.e., any sentence follows from any sentence. (For more on this, see
below, section 5.) Deciding how to handle these issues significantly exceeds what
can be reasonably characterised as a process of formalisation.
Thus, in practice the formation of logics is a rough-going process of theorification
responsible to the pre-formal practice, informed by it and, allegedly at least, placed
under its control to a certain extent. The process goes beyond simple formalisation
and is not at all unproblematic.
RE is meant to guide us on the righteous path of smoothing out these asperities
and forming a justified logic, by debunking whatever tensions may arise between 1-
and 2-knowledge. Can it really do this? I think not and in the next three sections,
I will explore three cases of current logical debates, consideration of which will
explain why I am sceptical about the promises of RE.
4. Case study no. 1: Multiple conclusions
Orthodox logical theorising (Dummett, 1991; Steinberger, 2010) teaches that an
argument has one or more premises and only one conclusion. In this it is faithful
6Famously, Quine rejected second-order logic as set theory ‘in sheep’s clothes’ (Quine, 1970). But
the same logic was forcefully defended by Shapiro (1991).
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to the practice, insofar as it appears that natural language arguments have but one
conclusion. At the same time, inferences of the form:
(6) ¬¬A DNE
A
are generally accepted in the daily ratiocinative practice. That is, one tends to
accept inferences by double negation elimination (DNE).
As it turns out, these pre-theoretical commitments stand in an uneasy tension,
albeit one that needs a rather sophisticated background theory to surface fully.
This background theory is a version of logical inferentialism, better known as proof-
theoretic semantics (Prawitz, 1965, 1974; Schroeder-Heister, 2014; Francez, 2015),
whose roots can be traced back to Gentzen (1935). Proof-theoretic semantics the-
orists hold that the meaning of the logical operators is determined by the primitive
rules of inference that govern how sentences in which they feature as principal op-
erators are, respectively, introduced and eliminated from proofs. These two kinds
of rules for an operator must match; to put it in jargon: they must be in harmony
(Dummett, 1991). If harmony does not obtain, then the operator is illegitimate
and so is the inferential behaviour it sanctions. Moreover, the test for the ‘match’
between the introduction and elimination rules is syntactic in nature. There must
be a syntactically assessable property the obtaining of which witnesses the harmo-
nious character of the pairing. (This is why proof-theoretic semantics is salient for
spotting the aforementioned tension: It requires meaning explanations to proceed
in terms of syntactical properties against the background of the rules used and the
structure of the proofs. On truth-conditional approaches to the meaning of the
logical terms, the syntax of the proof system matters not at all. The behaviour of
the logical operators is determined by their truth conditions and it is plain that,
at least if one assumes a bivalent notion of truth, there is no way of making A
false when ¬¬A is true. That’s the end of the story: whether this behaviour is
best tracked by a single- or a multiple-conclusion proof system is irrelevant for the
validity of DNE.)
DNE is obviously an elimination rule for negation. The corresponding introduc-
tion rule is the (intuitionistic) reductio ad absurdum:
(7)
[A]j
...
¬A iRAA, j¬A
It turns out that these two rules cannot be harmonised if arguments (and the formal
proofs representing them) are single-conclusion. A familiar, if bitterly contested,
account of harmony has it that a set of introductions and eliminations for a log-
ical constant is harmonious only if its addition to a proof system is conservative
(Dummett, 1991).7 That is, to the extent that the addition generates new valid
arguments, then these must involve the novel vocabulary. Famously, Peirce’s law
(8) ((A→ B) → A) → A
despite containing only one logical operator, the conditional, is not provable in
intuitionistic logic. A fortiori, it is not provable using only the rules for the con-
ditional. However, once one adds DNE to intuitionistic logic—thus ensuring that
negation behaves classically—there is a proof of it. (I leave the construction of the
proof as an exercise for the reader.) It follows from this that classical negation is
7Not much hinges on this contested account of harmony. It features here because it is the best
known. For a defence of it, see Dicher (2016); for criticism, see Read (2000). For a more recent
proposal see Gratzl and Orlandelli (2017).
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not harmonious. The strongest correct rules for negation are those of intuitionistic
logic.
But this holds water only if arguments and the formal proofs representing them
are single-conclusion. Only in this case does classical negation yield a nonconser-
vative extension of intuitionistic logic. If multiple conclusions are allowed, classical
negation is conservative and hence harmonious. In such systems there are proofs
of Peirce’s law in the implicational fragment alone:
(9)
[A]1 W
A,B →I, 1
A,A→ B [(A→ B) → A]2 →E
A,A C
A →I, 2
((A→ B) → A) → A
Now let us find our way out of this, guided by RE. Assume that our background
theory, i.e., the commitment to inferentialism and the account of harmony as con-
servativeness, is sacrosanct. (To be sure, this is a contentious assumption. I will
say a bit more by way of motivating it in footnote 9.)
The first thing to notice is that the tension we ought to resolve is not between the
pre-formal practice and our theoretical commitments. Rather, it is a tension within
the practice—albeit one that comes to the fore only against the background of a
commitment to a proof-theoretic account of the meaning of the logical vocabulary.8
It seems that in order to even be able to ‘reflect equilibristically’ on the matter, one
must antecedently form some reasonably justified theoretical beliefs about validity,
the structure of proofs, etc. In other words, one needs (some theory in order) to
generate a tension between 1-knowledge and 2-knowledge.9
On the flip side, this picture suggests that revisions that put in accord the prac-
tice with the theory—against the background of its more abstract pronouncements—
are somehow inescapable. Alas, it seems to me that it also leads to the demise of
RE as a significant methodological constraint in logical theorising:
If we agree that any theory will mutilate in some way some aspects of the practice
to which we would otherwise wish to remain faithful, then it follows that any and
all resolutions of conflicts must, ultimately, do violence to the practice or, which
amounts to the same thing, to 1-knowledge. Note that the assumption made is
not at all surprising, given that theorification presupposes a great deal of system-
atisation. In the particular scenario at hand and, consequently, in all scenarios
relevantly analogous, it is indeed unavoidable, since the practice itself is less than
coherent.
The moral of the story is that logical facts, as discernible in the vernacular
ratiocinative practice, are fragile.10 They are bound to succumb to the pressures
exerted by needs peculiar to theorification or to its perceived benefits. Resolving
conflicts is not so much a matter of finding some equilibrium between the practice
8For characterisations of RE involving the appeal to a background theory, see Brun (2003, 2012,
2014) and the references therein. Notice that Brun’s ‘background theories’ may be more encom-
passing than those described here.
9But why would anyone do that? Why not outrightly modify the background theory so that there
is no conflict? Presumably, that background theory, including its tension generating aspects, is
not embraced idiosyncratically. One clings to it because it explains better other aspects of the
practice one is theorising about. It is, in other words, the best theory one has thus far about the
target practice. Besides, it is not a stretch to expect that modifications to the background theory
will generate other tensions, pertaining perhaps to other parts of the practice. Indeed, it would
be foolishly optimistic to expect otherwise.
10This is abundantly illustrated by the actual solutions to the problem of multiple conclusions;
see Dicher (2020a).
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and the theory, as it is a matter of finding a convenient excuse to obliterate the
inconvenient aspects of the practice.
This may appear to blatantly contradict another problem raised with respect
to RE by Woods (2019). Woods, following Wright (1986), accuses the procedure
of suffering irremediably of the problem of ‘too many degrees of freedom’. That
is, it leaves open too many areas for revision, mainly with respect to what I have
termed here the background theory. In particular, even the beliefs that brought
about the conflict may be subject to revisions. I believe that the contradiction
is merely apparent. I’ve blocked that possibility and kept the background theory
unchangeable precisely in order to avoid the degrees of freedom problem because I
believe that Woods’ diagnosis is correct in the absence of that assumption. Now
we see that even with it RE fares less than stellarly.
One may argue that this does not go against RE, which does not require that
the resolution of the conflicts be balanced, or ‘just’, etc. All that RE requires is
that we resolve the tensions between the practice and the theory, even if, as I have
claimed, this will systematically ensue in the theory gaining the upper hand. But
then it seems that RE, as a methodological requirement, amounts to little more
than the injunction to pay some attention to the domain one is theorising about.
This, of course, is a piece of eminently reasonable advice. It is also about as useful
in guiding our investigations of that domain as the prophecies of the oracle of Delphi
would be in planning one’s future.
This, then, is the first complaint that I have against the thesis that RE is a
meaningful guide to the formation of logics: That ‘real’ equilibrium matters little
for it, and that the process of achieving what we may call ‘internal’ equilibrium, is
heavily rigged in favour of theoretical considerations.
5. Case study no. 2: Which logic is this?
I have already mentioned classical logic. Despite its many merits, few logicians
expect classical logic to perform well in the presence of of paradox-generating vo-
cabulary like vague predicates or transparent truth. But are they right in thinking
this?
Contrary to these common beliefs, an impressive case has been put forward by
Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij (2012; 2013) on behalf of classical logic being
able to handle the aforementioned troublesome vocabulary without degenerating
into a trivial consequence relation (see also Ripley, 2012, 2013). To be sure, this is
classical logic in a particular and rather special guise—special enough to give it a
name of its own: ST , pronounced ‘strict-tolerant’. Let us see us how classical logic
and ST handle the paradoxes and in what sense the latter is classical.
Our starting point is Gentzen’s sequent calculus for classical logic, LK (Gentzen,
1935). Recall that this contains the Cut rule:
(10) X : Y,A A,X : Y
X : Y
Now if one were to add, e.g., the T -rules from (5) above to LK, then the system
would become trivial: any conclusion would follow from any premisses. To see this,
let λ be a sentence such that λ ≡df ¬T 〈λ〉. Thus λ is the (strengthened) Liar:
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‘This sentence is not true’.11 Then we can derive the empty sequent:
(11)
Id
T 〈λ〉 : T 〈λ〉 ¬-L, ¬-R¬T 〈λ〉 : ¬T 〈λ〉
df
λ : λ
T -L
T 〈λ〉 : λ ¬-L
: ¬T 〈λ〉, λ df, Contraction
: λ
Id
T 〈λ〉 : T 〈λ〉 ¬-L, ¬-R¬T 〈λ〉 : ¬T 〈λ〉
df
λ : λ
T -R
λ : T 〈λ〉 ¬-R¬T 〈λ〉, λ : df, Contraction
λ : Cut:
from which in turn A : B follows for any A,B via Weakening.
Gentzen (1935) proved that Cut is eliminable from LK in the sense that any
derivable LK-sequent is derivable without using Cut; hence LK and its cut-less
variant, LK−, are equivalent in that they derive the same sequents. Since in (11)
Cut is essential for deriving the troublesome empty sequent, we have two proof
systems that, although equivalent in the absence of the truth predicate, behave
differently when extended with the rules governing it.
LK− can be used to formalise ST , which has the same valid sequents as classical
logic but allows for non-trivial and conservative extensions with the sort of vocabu-
lary that generates troubles classically. Semantically, its consequence relation can
be characterised by the strong Kleene valuations (Kleene, 1952), given below for
conjunction, disjunction and negation, when A follows from some premises (bun-
dled in the set) X iff, whenever each of the statements in X has the value 1, the
conclusion A has a value in {1, 12}:12
∧ 1 12 0
1 1 12 0
1
2
1
2
1
2 0
0 0 0 0
∨ 1 12 0
1 1 1 1
1
2 1 12 12
0 1 12 0
¬
1 0
1
2
1
2
0 1
This brings about a wealth of questions of paramount importance for logical
theorising: Is ST truly the same logic as classical logic or are they different logics?
And, if the latter, in what may their difference consist of? Is transitivity, as en-
capsulated by Cut, an essential property of a logic or is it something that we can
dispense with? And, for that matter, just what (kind of) properties are Cut and
similar, sequent-to-sequent, structures?
One thing that seems plain in light of the above discussion is that, if in deciding
what logic we are dealing with we keep track only of provable sequents (over the
usual language of classical logic), then there is no way to spot the difference between
ST and classical logic. Is there any (good) reason to so identify logics? Indeed there
is. Sequents are usually construed as inferences or claims that the formula(e) on
the right-hand side of the symbol ‘:’ follow from the formula(e) on the left-hand
side of the same symbol. Thus ST and classical logic have the same logically valid
inferences.
But is this enough when it comes to unequivocally determining the identity of
the logic expressed by a formal proof system?13 The case of ST seems to suggest
11The truth predicate is essential for expressing λ, though it is not the only required ingredient.
The name forming operator 〈. . .〉 is equally important. For more technical details about this setup,
including the matter of how to render λ expressible, see Ripley (2012).
12This interpretation of classical logic goes back to Girard (1976). Note also that, usually, the
consequence relation of ST is taken to be multiple-conclusion: a set of conclusions follows from a
set of premises whenever all the premises are 1 and at least one of the conclusions has a value in
{1, 1
2
}.
13This question can be asked with respect to similar, if simpler situations, see, e.g., Hjortland
(2013) where it is shown how one proof-system can express two different logics. See also Dicher
(2020b).
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otherwise. One place where the difference between classical logic and ST comes to
the fore is in the sequent-to-sequent rules they validate. ST loses Cut and many
other classically valid sequent-to-sequent inferences or metainferences as they have
become known in the literature (Barrio et al., 2015, 2018). Indeed, it has been
proved (Barrio et al., 2015; Dicher and Paoli, 2019) that while the valid sequents of
ST determine classical logic, its valid metainferences determine the logic of paradox,
LP (q.v. Priest, 1979).
The ST -theorists are well aware and unperturbed by this fact. For them, these
metainferences, or rather the rules they generate, are mere ‘closure principles’ which
a consequence relation may or may not obey, cf. Cobreros et al. (2013). Alas,
whether or not this is the correct way to look at Cut and other metainferences
is a disputed matter. It certainly isn’t the only one. For instance, Dicher and
Paoli (2018) have argued that a logic is actually an equivalence class determined in
a suitable way by those metainferences that are valid in the following sense: any
valuation that satisfies the premise sequents also satisfies the conclusion sequents.14
From this perspective, ST is not classical logic, but rather LP .
So much for ST and its properties; now let us return to RE. Suppose that at the
end of a careful process of formalising various natural language arguments we end
up with the class of classically valid sequents as a codification of the class of valid
inferences. Have we thereby also settled the matter of whether we have formalised
classical or strict-tolerant logic? I believe that we have not and that we have formed
our logic while somehow failing to form an accurate idea of which logic it is. For
that, we need to answer a few more questions: What are we to make of the loss of
Cut and other metainferences in ST? Or of the fact that ST , unlike classical logic,
appears to be somehow ambiguous between two different consequence relations, the
classical one and that of LP? These are central, albeit very abstract, problems in
logical theorising and certainly salient issues in the formation of logics.
Is there any hope that RE can meaningfully guide us when we set about settling
them? At first blush, one may expect that it ought to: after all, the debate is
ultimately a debate over the role and status of Cut. The scenario, boiling down
to deciding whether a particular (and rather special) metainference rule is valid
seems to fit quite well in the Goodmanian framework. But this deceptively simple
question quickly spirals out of control, becoming an arcane matter about obscure
properties of logical systems and even about how these systems codify consequence
relations. It is not just a case of revising, say, our concept of consequence such as
to allow non-transitive relations to count as such.
The sort of questions raised by ST and its designation as ‘classical’ cannot be an-
swered by following the imperative of reaching an equilibrium between (intuitively
acceptable) inferences one is not willing to give up and one’s views about which
rules of inference ought to be accepted. Even the framing of the problem exceeds
the resources available within the RE model.
As with problematisation, so with problem-solving. (This is where the ‘too many
degrees of freedom’ problem, already hinted at above creeps upon us.) Reaching
a RE underdetermines the issues at hand. To see this, assume for the sake of the
argument that the problem can be meaningfully framed as a typical Goodmanian
problem (and also bracket the many details at play in the debate around ST ).
What is apparent is that something has to go, either the principle of infer-
ence codified by Cut or the vocabulary that makes it possible to express Liars,
14This is ‘local’ metainferential validity. In contrast, one speaks of global metainferential validity
when the universal quantifier is wide scope: for any valuation, if it satisfies the premises, then it
satisfies the conclusion.
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together with its associated inferential resources.15 Whatever ‘firm’ anchor point
the pre-formal practice might provide us, such as, for instance, the almost universal
acceptance of transitivity as a property of consequence relations, this loses its ap-
peal rather quickly. This inference principle generates inferences we are unwilling
to accept, if we let it interact with other, equally intuitive, principles such as the
T -rules. Plainly, RE cannot tell us which way to proceed and what to sacrifice—at
least because all the inference principles at play have a good pre-theoretical hold
on us.
This is not incompatible with it being possible to defend one or another solu-
tion. But those solutions and their defences must, of necessity, rely on something
more than doing justice to the pre-formal intuitions. Moreover, their virtue sim-
ply cannot be that they have balanced our pre-theoretical commitments with our
pre-theoretical practice, for this virtue could be boasted by many rival solutions.
6. Case study no. 3: Paraconsistent christology and FDE
Very recently, JC Beall (2017), took to investigating the so-called fundamental
problem of christology (q.v. Pawl, 2016) in light of his favourite logic, FDE or first-
degree entailment. Briefly, the problem is that Patristic theology consecrates the
dual nature, divine and human, of Christ. Being divine, Christ is immutable; being
human, he is mutable. As a god, Christ is omnipotent; as a human, his powers are
limited, etc. Christ, in other words, is possessed of inconsistent attributes. Of him,
it is true both that ‘Christ is P ’ and that ‘Christ is not P ’, for a good number of
essential predicates P . Because contradictions are bad in that they do not further
the objective of achieving rational knowledge of the object that ‘embodies’ them,
this is problem for christology.
Beall argues that the best solution to this problem is also the simplest: bite the
bullet and accept that Christ is a contradictory object. That, however, is not really
a bad thing. In particular, he argues, it does not entail that rational theological
inquiry about Christ is impossible. Contradictions may be true of Christ, but they
are not as bad as traditional (Aristotelian, classical, etc.) logicians took them to
be. They can be handled by appropriate logics. Thus Beall argues that the proper
logic for analytic Christology is the paraconsistent FDE (Anderson and Belnap,
1975; Belnap, 1977).
In its most common guise, FDE is a four-valued, truth-functional, and structural
logic that recognises, as Beall puts it, a space of logical possibilities that allows a
statement to be true (= 1), false (= 0), both true and false (= b, a ‘glut’), and neither
true nor false (= n, a ‘gap’). The following matrices show how these mappings can
be extended to valuations:
∧ 1 b n 0
1 1 b n 0
b b b 0 0
n n 0 n 0
0 0 0 0 0
∨ 1 b n 0
1 1 1 1 1
b 1 b 1 b
n 1 1 n n
0 1 b n 0
¬
1 0
b b
n n
0 1
Both 1 and b are designated values and a conclusion A follows from some premises
X if and only if, whenever the premises are at least true, the conclusion too is at
least true. (Mutatis mutandis, the same definition applies to multiple-conclusion
formalisations of FDE. For sequent calculi for FDE, see Beall (2013); Shapiro
(2017).)
15Indeed, other options are possible, but I stick to the limits of the scenario above. Notice also that
it is not just liars that are problematic. Vagueness, for instance, can lead to the same problems
and be treated in like manner.
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Theological and para-theological considerations aside, I agree with Beall, at least
in the following sense: One’s best hope of achieving a state of RE between the
orthodox patristic determinations of Christ and one’s logical beliefs is to endorse a
paraconsistent logic. Ceteris paribus, FDE will do just marvellously.
But now suppose that one would wish to reject FDE on account of being too
weak: it does not recognise as valid a great deal many inferences that we have a
‘natural’ propensity to accept.16 By the lights of RE-theorists, this should count
against it. But could such criticism be levelled against FDE on the basis of RE
considerations? Alas, it is difficult to see how this could be done. The FDE
theorist has a very quick way out of this difficulty. All she needs point out is
that the incriminated inference is not logically valid (after all, it is not FDE-valid)
although it may be valid within some restricted domain of inquiry, maybe because
the predicates of that domain have some special properties. By FDE lights, those
inferences need not be rejected simpliciter though they are rejectable as a matter
of logic. While indeed FDE is very weak, it can peacefully co-exist with various
strictly speaking non-logical strengthenings of it.
So far, this has nothing to do with Christology, paraconsistent or otherwise.
But suppose that a FDE theorist’s main reasons to uphold this logic have to
do with it cohering with her theological beliefs, in particular with her belief that
Christ is an inconsistent object. (‘Main’ as used here is simply meant to signal the
importance that our paraconsistent logician ascribes to coherence between their
logical theological beliefs.) One trying to dislodge FDE as an (all-purpose) logic
would be in quite a pickle. It seems clear that one could not move the FDE
theorist to change her view. Indeed, why would she do so? Not only would this
require that she give up a state of RE, but it would require her to do so despite
having a very handy way of retaining it, i.e., denying the logicality of the FDE-
invalid inferences while admitting that they are domain-limited valid (or perhaps
analytical, etc.). At the limit, such a logician may even claim that FDE is too
weak for every other domain but Christology. This is by no means an irrational
claim, despite the seeming exoticism of the preoccupation with the divine nature
in this age. (By contrast, a logician that would aspire towards coherence between
her logical beliefs and the reasoning mistakes she most commonly commits would
presumably be acting irrationally.) And it would certainly help her continue being
in the state towards which our theorising must strive, that of RE.
There is nothing wrong with this in either the present or in any particular case
whatsoever. The problem is that this is a pervasive trend: Setting a state of RE
as the ultimate justification for our logical beliefs will tend to render weak logics
immune to criticism. Quite simply, it seems very unlikely that an FDE-opponent
of the kind described will ever be in as good a state of (reflective) equilibrium as
an FDE-champion. The FDE theorist can be in equilibrium with respect to their
mathematical, logical, theological and in particular Chalcedonian, and whatnot
beliefs. And, presumably, a trivialist who believes that there are no logically valid
arguments, can do even better.
This is a pathological condition to the extent that it means that weaker logics
will systematically have a better chance of being justified by RE, simply because
RE is easier to obtain for such a logic. Worse, given the role and purpose of RE,
there is little incentive to aim for stronger logics.
One may reply that this is not so: A weaker logic means sacrificing—as far as
logic is concerned—some inferences which we are generally willing to accept. But
16This task fits well with the main burden that the proponents of sub-classical logics have had to
grapple historically: that of giving up as little as possible of the power of classical logic.
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both the practice and other logical considerations may press exactly for their accep-
tance qua logically valid. That is true. But to the extent that these considerations
are forced upon us by the practice, then, as we have already seen, they are easily
brushed aside. The tendency to accept a given inference says nothing as to whether
the inference is logically valid, restrictedly logically valid, analytically valid and so
on. It is something that needs to be integrated and explained within a bigger the-
oretical picture. (So we reach again to our old conclusion that (seemingly) logical
facts are fragile.) If, on the other hand, the aforementioned considerations are of
a theoretical nature, then the justification process itself does not appear to be one
whose stake is the successful or coherent integration of pre-theoretical beliefs with
theoretical ones. Rather, it appears to be a game of making the best case for one’s
theoretical conviction. There can be no doubt that doing justice to the ‘facts’ will
be part of this process; it is just implausible that it will be the dominant part.
7. Epilogue
These, then, are the main problems with RE as a guide to logical theorising:
First, theoretical considerations appear to always be able to undercut whatever
tendencies may exist in the pre-formal practice. This means that understood as
a methodology, RE is too weak because one of the ‘reflecting’ surfaces itself is
too weak. Second, I have argued that this methodology underdetermines both
the identification of the specific problems one may encounter in ‘the formation of
logics’, i.e., problematisation, and the problem-solving process itself. Finally, RE
systematically favours weaker logics. The weaker a logic is, the easier it will be to
bring its prescriptions into harmony with other beliefs we may hold.
Part of the drama of reflective equilibrium is that it appears to fit parts of the
(empirical) process of theorification, in particular, formalisation. There is little
reason to doubt that the process of theorification starts by working on some raw
materials—real inferences, made by real people in the real world. It also seems to
me that it is correct to say that the processing of this data is both kept in check
by the data and informs it in its turn. This much is inescapable insofar as we take
logic to be an applied theory, i.e., our theory of correct reasoning (Priest, 2006, ch.
8).
That, however, does not make RE a plausible methodological constraint on, and
even less so an appropriate account of the justification of, theorification—not when
the chips are down. So, while the Goodmanian image with which we have started
is tempting enough, turning it into a successful recipe for logical theorising turns
out to be a hopeless job.17
At the fringe, reflective equilibrium becomes what the Senate and the consulate
were in imperial Rome. One pays lip service to them. One uses them for ritual
purposes. Every now and then one looks to them for (very) rough guidance to avoid
too extravagant errors. And that’s about it. The real power lies with the preto-
rians: the highly disciplined, highly skilled, and utterly unscrupulous theoretical
considerations.
8. Postscript
Despite having reached the end of the story, the paper must go, because an
anonymous referee asked the most important question to which I did not wish to
answer here: ‘What are the viable alternatives?’.
17I am not alone in reaching this conclusion. See, e.g., the previously quoted paper by Woods
(2019) and also Wright (1986); Shapiro (2000). For recent critical discussions of RE in non-logical
contexts, see McPherson (2015); Kelly and McGrath (2010). An impressive array of objections to
RE is surveyed and critically discussed in Cath (2016).
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I stand by my decision not to answer this question here, because I cannot do
it justice within the space of this paper. Still, a few words, gesturing towards my
favoured answer, may be useful.
Let this be my starting point: I have framed reflective equilibrium as a method
embodying a fallibilist epistemology of logic. My criticism of RE did not concern the
suggestion that logical inquiry is fallible, that we can be wrong in our identification
of the ‘laws of logic’, etc. Nor did I challenge the claim that (parts) of the processes
of logical theorisation and theorification can be described as proceeding according to
a successive series of revisions of the ‘theory’ in light of the ‘data’ and conversely.
What I have challenged is the claim that this can be turned into a substantive
methodological requirement that would ensue in a justified logical theory.18 To
that extent, I do not wish to endorse fully an apriorist epistemology of logic.
These are the standard (or at least traditional) options in the epistemology of
logic. I incline towards a different viewpoint. Thus the answer to the question
‘What is the best methodology for logical inquiry?’ requires a preliminary answer
to a deeper question, about how we should think about logic. As for the answer to
this last question, (Allo, 2017, 546) puts it best:
[I]t makes sense to think of logic as a kind of cognitive technology: a
tool or set of tools used to reason more efficiently. The proposal to
see logic as conceptual technology extends the scope of this picture,
and emphasises that all the core notions that logical systems give
a formal account of (like validity, consistency, possibility, and per-
haps even meaning) should be understood as artefacts that shape
deductive reasoning practices rather than as neutral descriptions or
codifications of pre-existing inferential practices.
So the referee’s question ‘What are the viable alternatives?’ has a simple but
hardly informative answer: Whatever methodology best serves the imperative of
developing the best cognitive technology that logic can be. What that actually
means is a matter for further thinking.19
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